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ent THE FIRST MARCOS ADMINISTRATION,
1966—69
Expansionary Monetary and Fiscal Policies, 1966 to Mid-1967.
Immediately upon its assumption of power in 1966, the Marcos adminis-
tration initiated vigorous efforts to accelerate development in both the agri-
cultural and industrial sectors. In the first month of the year, the monetary au-
thorities pursued a policy which they described as one "of massive credit
relaxation." 1Thebasic rediscount rate of 6 per cent was lowered to 4¾ per
• cent, rediscount ceilings on commercial banks were raised, reserve require-
• ments against savings and time deposits were reduced, and the reserve require-
ment on special time deposits was cut from 100 per cent to 50 per cent.
Further steps to ease the credit situation followed in later months. The
• reserve requirement on special time deposits was reduced to 25 per cent in
February, and finally in March the special time-deposit requirement for all
import letters of credit and the reserve requirement against these deposits
were eliminated. With this policy step the exchange-control system became
completely liberalized. (However, Phase V of the Bhagwati-Krueger schema
is dated as beginning in November 1965, when a unified exchange rate was
established.) Rediscount ceilings continued to be increased with the result that
by July 1966 the amount of Central Bank credit available to the commercial
J banks was three times as large as that available in December 1965. Special
•I advances from the Central Bank outside of the rediscount ceilings were also
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madeavailable to certain banks. In June, the old selective credit system estab-
lishing credit ceilings for different types of loans was abolished and replaced
by a more modest scheme limiting the types of credit instruments eligible for
rediscounting at the Central Bank.
The monetary authorities continued their easy money policy through the
first half of 1967. For example, in support of the government's efforts to ex-
pand rice production, the Central Bank in early 1967 issued circulars per-
mitting commercial banks to rediscount a larger proportion of the commercial
paper issued by the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) and authorizing
the Philippine National Bank to rediscount promissory notes of the RCA with
the Central Bank at the 3 per cent preferred rate. The regulations covering for-
eign borrowing through standby letters of credit for the purpose of generating
pesos were also eased. Still another expansionary policy was the reduction of
the maximum interest rate paid on time deposits by commercial and savings
banks from 6½ per cent to 6 per cent. The announced purpose of this move
was to enable these banks to reduce their prime rates on loans for production
purposes and for projects included in the government's development program.
Another important financial operation aimed at restoring full utilization
of the economy's productive capacity was the so-called rehabilitation program
of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). This refinancing program
for distressed firms consisted of three parts, namely: (1) refinancing through
such conventional methods as loan extensions, deferments, and revision of loan
terms; (2) conversion of DBP industrial loan accounts into preferred stock
of the assisted firms which later could be converted into common stock; (3)
foreign-exchange financing of imports of machinery and raw materials through
credit lines and guarantees arranged by DBP with banking institutions and
government export-import agencies abroad. Between April 1966, when the
program started, and the end of the year, about fifteen hundred loan accounts
amounting to P252 million were refinanced through conventional methods,
whereas a total of P62 million was invested by the bank in the preferred stock
of some eight firms. In 1967, refinancing through conventional methods to-
taled P265 million and through the securities scheme P735 million. To imple-
ment the refinancing program, the bank issued bonds that could, if the holder
wished, later be exchanged for any of the industrial preferred shares available
in the bank's portfolio. By the end of 1967, about P200 million worth of such
bonds had been issued.
In addition to providing easier credit conditions, the new administration
embarked upon a large-scale program of economic development which em- C
phasized rural infrastructure investments such as roads, irrigation projects,
schools, telecommunications, etc. The administration apparently chose to
focus upon rural development on the grounds that it was the rural sector
which was constraining efforts to restore the high growth rates of the 1950s.
'1
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Inparticular, the most influential economic advisers of that time believed that
:ed the inlIation of about 25 per cent in food prices between 1962 and 1965 was
the major factor in preventing the earlier decontrol and currency depreciation
efforts from restoring high growth rates. Expanding the rural growth rate
:he would supposedly provide larger amounts of foreign exchange for imports of
capital goods and raw materials by increasing traditional exports and reducing
er- food imports, would increase the supplies of wage goods for the industrial sec-
:ial tor, and would increase the market for domestic manufactures. The magni-
ng tude and composition of the national government's capital expenditures pro-
ith gram from 1959 through 1971 are indicated in Table 4-1. As is shown in the
table, the volume of capital outlays rose significantly in the 1966—69 period.
.ng However, distribution of expenditures between social and economic develop-
of ment remained essentially unchanged.
igs In order to finance capital formation activities of the national and local
ye governments as well as those of such government corporations as the Devel-
on opment Bank of the Philippines, and also provide funds for expanded current
m. expenditures on developmental services, it was necessary for the government
to engage in extensive borrowing both internally and externally (see Table
4-2). The internal debt increased from P3.1 billion at the end of 1965, or
rn 14.7 per cent of GNP, to P5.8 billion by the end of 1969, or 18.4 per cent of
gh GNP; and the external public debt rose from $491 million to $828 million be-
an tween these years. The Central Bank, the commercial banks, and various gov-
ck ernment entities ended up as the main holders of outstanding internal debt.
3) Specifically, about P2.4 million of the P2.7 million total increase in internal
gh debt was absorbed by these institutions.
he
i CreditTightening and the Reintroduction of Exchange Controls,
its Mid-1967 Through 1968.
Is,
ck The significant expansion of domestic credit and the rise in government
investment expenditures brought about an upward movement in prices as well
.e- as a deterioration in the balance of trade. Wholesale prices rose 6.6 per cent
er between 1965 and 1966 and 7.4 per cent between 1966 and 1967. However,
more important to policymakers than the price rise was the worsening of the
country's trade balance. From a trade account surplus of $24 million in 1965
and a deficit of $9 million in 1966, the merchandise trade deficit rose to $224
)fl million in 1967. To help finance these additional net imports, the country
drew on its gold tranche of $27.5 million at the International Monetary Fund.
Other important policies that were undertaken by the Central Bank in the pe-
to nod from mid-1967 through 1968 are summarized in Table 4-3.
Starting in mid-1967, the Central Bank began to reverse its easy credit
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TABLE4-2
I -
Internal and External Debt of the Government
and Monetary Institutions, 1949—71
External Debt





1949 466 317 66 83 117 117 —
1950—53 666 503 65 98 111 111 —
1954—57 1,266 915 40 311 89 89 —
1958—61 2,136 1,465 32 639 175 139 35
1962—65 2,904 1,831 35 1,038 324 219 105
1966—69 4,522 2,686 102 1,734 689 359 330
1970—71 6,635 3,966 106 2,534 1,058 556 502
SOURCE: CentralBank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin,December,1.970, pp.
25 1—252 and 256; and CentralBank, Annual Report, 1971, pp. 26 and 29.
TABLE 4-3
Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1967—68
June 1967 Central Bank initiated stage-by-stage increase in reserve requirements
from 12 to 16 per cent; raised rediscount rate from 4% to 6 per cent,
and required commercial banks to maintain 1-to-l ratio between
actual foreign-exchange assets and foreign-exchange liabilities.
Reimposition of cash margin deposits when letters of credit are opened.
Feb. 1968Further increase in rediscount rate to 7.5 per cent.
March 1968Imposition of absolute limit on foreign-exchange liabilities of commer-
cial banks.
June 1968Replacement of cash margin requirement with special time-deposit re-
quirement against letters of credit: the less essential the imported
goods, the higher the percentage requirement.
Oct. 1968 Imposition on commercial banks of ceilings on domestic loans and on
foreign-currency letters of credit.
Announcement of stage-by-stage reduction in time-deposit requirement
against letters of credit for essential producer goods. Imposition of
ceilings on credit for import financing and on domestic loan port-
folios.
I.
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forcommercial banks gradually from 12 per cent to 16 per cent, increased the
basic rediscount rate from 4¾ per cent to 6 per cent, stipulated that commer- ti
cial banks must maintain a 1-to-i ratio between actual foreign-exchange as-
1
sets and foreign-exchange liabilities, and issued a circular under which all im-
ports over $100 were to be covered by letters of credit. Furthermore, the
monetary authorities were successful, through so-called moral suasion, in ob-
taining an agreement among the commercial banks to impose cash margin
deposits on the opening of letters of credit. The schedule was as follows:
Essential producer and consumer goods 25% Ii
Semiessential producer goods 50
Semiessential consumer and nonessential producer goods 75
Luxury items and nonessential consumer goods and others 150 ii
ti
The margin deposits were subject to a 100 per cent reserve, 50 per cent of
which could be in the form of government securities. The deposits were to be
held by the banks until the corresponding import bills were liquidated. To-
gether with other controls imposed during the 1967—70 period over the free
use of foreign exchange, this action marked a return of the Philippines to
Phase I of the Bhagwati-Krueger schema, namely, the introduction and grad-
ual tightening of exchange controls. However, it must be emphasized that
these controls were much less stringent than those adopted in the early 1950s.
Later in 1967, exemptions from the margin requirement were made for cer-
tain raw materials imported by selected local industries, for some 57 corn- e
modities in the essential-consumer-goods category, and for 4 items in the o
essential-producer-goods category. Furthermore, the financing of imports of
these items was permitted through open-account arrangements. i
Two later actions involved accelerating the increase in the reserve re-
quirement against demand deposits so that it reached 16 per cent by Novem-
ber 30, 1967, and restricting the sale of foreign exchange for travel to $50 per
person per day with a yearly maximum of $1,500 per person. S
Additional steps to limit credit and reduce the drain on foreign exchange p
continued to be adopted in 1968. In February the basic rediscount rate was 1
raised from 6 per cent to 7½ per cent, and the preferential rate for loans on d
rice and corn, from 3 per cent to 4 per cent. In the international area, the
Central Bank, in March 1968, lifted the requirement that commercial banks e
maintain a full cover of their foreign-exchange liabilities, but introduced in its
place a requirement that, for any one bank, foreign-exchange liabilities not ex- d
ceed their June 27, 1967, level or $1.5 million, whichever was higher. How- flu
ever, in September, this was raised to $2.5 million per bank. To increase the 1
time during which the cash margin must be held, the Central Bank also stip- r
ulated, in March, that letters of credit must be opened on or before the actual
date of shipment.
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e In June 1968 the cash margin requirement was replaced by a special
time-deposit requirement against letters of credit, which were to be held for
120 days. The percentages were also increased to the following levels:
e Essential producer and consumer goods 50
Semiessential producer goods 75
Nonessentialproducer and semiessential consumer goods 100
Nonessential consumer goods and unclassified items 175
In October the time-deposit requirement for essential producer goods was
modified: it was immediately reduced to 40 per cent and then was reduced
gradually to a level of 25percent by mid-December. A few additional changes
in the other groups of items were also made. As a result, by mid-December
the rates were as follows :2
e Essential producer goods 25
- Essentialconsumer goods 50
e Semiessential producer goods 75
) Nonessential producer and semiessential consumer goods 100
Semiunclassified producer goods 125
- Nonessentialconsumer and semiunclassified consumer goods 150
t Unclassified producer and unclassified consumer goods 175
- Inorder to prevent the October reduction of the special time deposit for
- essentialproducer goods from aggravating the deficit pressures on the balance
of payments, the Central Bank simultaneously imposed ceilings on credits for
f import financing as well as on domestic loan portfolios. As of mid-November
1968, total outstanding foreign-currency letters of credits and total credits for
- importfinancing were limited to their mid-October levels. However, imports
for dollar-earning industries or infrastructure projects, including the govern-
ment's development program, were exempted from the ceilings. The ceiling
set on banks' domestic loan portfolios was 105 per cent of the level of these
I portfolios as of October 12, 1968, and was reduced to 102 per cent of that
level on December 31. Export credits as well as loans for rice and corn pro-
duction or distribution were exempted from this requirement.
I Despite tightened credit policies and the introduction of controls over for-
eign-exchange dealings, domestic loans and investments by the banking sys-
tem expanded 21 per cent in 1967 and another 11 per cent in 1968. The time-
deposit requirement was not as effective as was hoped for, due to foreign
financing of the special time deposit.3 The trade account deficit rose from its
1967 level of $224 million to $274 million in 1968. Again the Central Bank
resorted to assistance from the IMF and drew on its first and second credit
tranche totaling $55million.
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relativestability of prices. Despite the 11 per cent increase in domestic credits, no
wholesale prices rose only 4.8 per cent, and consumer prices, 0.7 per cent. fo
The major reason for this reasonably satisfactory price performance was the co
breakthrough in rice production starting in the latter part of 1967. The suc- gc
cessful use of high-yielding varieties of rice as well as the expansion of irriga- rn
tion facilities not only increased yields per acre by 4.4 per cent between 1967 on
and 1968 but also led to a 6.7 per cent increase in the harvest area for rice. of
Between 1960 and 1966 total rice production had risen only 9 per cent, rn
whereas between 1966 and 1968 it increased 18 per cent.
Balance-of-Payments Difficulties in 1969.
Thebalance-of-payments situation continued to worsen as the govern- re
ment pursued deficit-spending activities, until it reached crisis proportions of
near the end of 1969. The major actions of the Central Bank in that year are




Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1969 in
April 1969Reduction in length of period that special time deposits must be held, and w
exclusion of domestic loans to certain export industries from previously re
instituted credit ceilings. ci
Lifting of ceiling on foreign-exchange liabilities of commercial banks. to
Increase in rediscount rate from 7.5to8.0 per cent. of
June 1969Introduction of 2 per cent levy on all Central Bank loans and advances.
Loans to government and high-priority export industries were excluded
from this charge.
di
Opening of import letters of credit permitted only for essential consumer bi
and producer goods, semiessential producer goods, and nonessential ti
producer goods. Ceiling for permitted letters of credit in these categories
also reduced.
m
Nov. 1969Further reduction in ceiling on import letters of credit. ce
trade were actually eased somewhat, though the trade deficit for the first two
quarters was running at an annual rate of $270 million. In April, for example, th
the Central Bank reduced the period during which banks must hold the special he
time deposits required for import letters of credit from 120 days to 90 days for
III
the following groups of commodities: essential producer goods; essential m
consumer goods; semiessential producer goods; semiessential consumer goods;-
71
THE FIRST MARCOS ADMINISTRATION, 1966—69 73
nonessential producer goods; and seiniunclassified producer goods. For the
nt' four remaining categories—nonessential consumer goods, semiunclassified
•he consumer goods, unclassified producer goods, and unclassified consumer
goods—the time requirement remained at 120 days. The bank also issued a
memorandum, in April, excluding export-oriented industries from the ceilings
67 on domestic loans.4 Imports of machinery and equipment for use in export-
ce oriented activities were also exempted from the special time-deposit require-
nt,
Additional liberalizing measures were taken in April 1969. Most impor-
tant was the lifting of the ceiling on foreign-exchange liabilities of commercial
banks. Another was the revoking of a November 1968 circular of the Central
Bank requiring currency declarations for departing and returning Philippine
residents, while still another was the granting of permission for 100 per cent
rns of the reserves against special time deposits to consist of government securities.
ire At the same time that particular industries and activities were given spe-
cial incentives to expand production, there were also some efforts to curtail
expansionary forces on a general level. For example, the rediscount rate was
increased in April from 7½ per cent to 8 per cent. In June, an additional
charge of 2 per cent was levied on all Central Bank loans and advances. Thus,
in effect, the rediscount rate was increased to 10 per cent. The reason given
= by the Central Bank for the levy was to align its rates with those prevailing in
world money markets. As has been the practice after the introduction of strong
sly restrictive measures by the Central Bank, exceptions to the 2 per cent interest
charge soon appeared, including loans and advances to the government, loans
to commercial banks secured by government securities and promissory notes
of the Rice and Corn Administration. High-priority export activities were
also excluded from the 2 per cent levy.
As is typical of the seasonal pattern in receipts and payments, during the
e first seven months of the year government receipts were slightly larger than
• disbursements. This surplus was, however, much too small to offset the large
budget deficit of the last five months that was related to the presidential elec-
•ial tion in November. The net deficit for the year was P934 million—an amount
ies over three times larger than in the previous year and roughly equal to the cu-
mulative deficits between 1961 and 1968. Equally dramatic was the 20 per
cent rise in the money supply in the last four months of 1969—from P4.0
million in August to P4.8 million in December. Of course, the large deficit and
large increase in the money supply were closely related. Central Bank loans to
le, the national government together with securities of the national government
•ial held by the Central Bank rose by P445 million in the last six months, and
national-government securities held by commercial banks increased by P219
million in the same time period.
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inthe last part of the year forced the Central Bank to adopt highly restrictive eit
policies toward the private sector. As of June 18, 1969, import letters of credit uci
could be opened only for four categories of commodities, namely, essential fit
producer goods, essential consumer goods, semiessential producer goods, and ter
nonessential producer goods. Furthermore, for the four permitted types of pe
imports a 15 per cent cutback was imposed, on June 18, on import letters of
credit relative to their October 1968—March 1969 levels, and another 15 per fro
cent was added on July 15. The level of 70 per cent of the base was held until de
November, when the ceiling was further restricted to 55 per cent of the base los
period, and the opening of letters of credit was divided into weekly allotments. tio
For all imports other than those in the four categories mentioned, the Central cei
Bank stipulated that its prior authorization was required.° Still another re- inc
strictive measure taken in November was to remove the privilege of open- In
account financing on imports of certain essential consumer and producer sp
goods. These were made subject to the general rule that imports must be fir
financed by letters of credit. Regulations on nonmerchandise trade were also un
tightened.7 fei
One indication of the seriousness of the financial situation near the end tin
of 1969 was that the Central Bank was forced to assume the interest burden
on the foreign credit lines of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) that were tio
associated with overdrafts of the PNB's accounts with certain U.S. commercial de
banks. In addition, from December until the peso was floated on February 21, de
1970, there were no interbank foreign-exchange transactions, since commer- ex
cial banks were required to surrender to the Central Bank foreign-exchange
holdings in excess of 25 per cent of outstanding foreign-currency liabilities. Co
The 1966—69 period demonstrates that Philippine economic develop-
ment cannot long be sustained at a high rate unless there is also a high growth (d
rate of export earnings. Extensive credit creation and foreign borrowing can in
initiate periods of prosperity; but unless these measures are accompanied by ta:
exchange-rate policies designed to maintain a vigorous export sector, these ite
periods of expanding economic activity are doomed to end suddenly as bal- ab




One merit of the development efforts of the Marcos administration was
the greater attention paid to expanding exports, especially of industrial prod- TI
ucts, than in previous administrations. Some of the special treatment given to
export activities has already been pointed out. The Investment Incentives Act
of 1967, which was aimed at stimulating production in key domestic industries Ex
as well as in export activities, is another example 'of this concern for increasing
exports. Under the act, a Board of Investment (BOl) was established which
determines the industries that qualify for' special aid. Firms are registered as itsr
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:tive either "preferred" or "pioneer," the latter being those that produce new prod-
edit ucts or processes in the economy. The BOl determines the list of activities that
atial fit these two categories of investment. The main forms of assistance to regis-
and tered firms are: (1) exemption for seven years from import duties and corn-
s of pensating taxes on imports of capital goods or a tax credit equivalent to these
s of taxes if the capital goods are purchased from domestic firms, (2) deduction
per from taxable income of all capitalized preoperating expenses, (3) accelerated
.intil depreciation of fixed assets, (4) liberal carry-over features for operating
base losses, and (5) deduction from taxable income of reinvested earnings. In addi-
mts. tion to these forms of assistance, pioneer firms are exempted from paying a
itral certain proportion (which declines over time) of all national taxes except the
•re- income tax8 and are given special tariff protection against competing imports.
In pioneer industries, 100 per cent foreign ownership is permitted unless
ucer specifically prohibited by law. However, in preferred investment areas, only
be finns at least 60 per cent owned by Filipinos can obtain the special privileges
also until three years have expired after the industry has been designated a "pre-
ferred" area of investment. If Filipinos do not enter the industry within this
end time period, the nationality criterion is dropped.
-den Registered firms that export completely finished products receive, in addi-
were tion to the aids previously cited, the following tax advantages: (1) double
-cial deduction from taxable income of export-promotion expenses, (2) double
21, deduction from taxable income of freight costs incurred in connection with
ner- exporting if Philippine ships are used or a one and one-half deduction if for-
tnge eign ships are employed, and (3) a tax credit equivalent to 7 per cent of the
ties. cost of raw materials used in export production.
lop- Export Incentives Act of 1970 expands the aids to export firms
iwth (defined as firms with at least 50 per cent of their sales to foreign countries)
can in the form of: (1) a tax credit equivalent to all sales, specific, and import
I by taxes on the raw materials and supplies used in export production, replacing
iese item 3 above; (2) a deduction of part of the firm's export revenue from tax-
bal- able items for five years; and (3) an exemption from export taxes. Under
item 2 just above, taxable income can be reduced for five years by the prod-
uct of the proportion of direct labor costs in total costs, the proportion of
local raw materials in total costs, the number 5, and export sales.9
was
rod- THE 1970 EXCHANGE CRISIS
n to AND ITS AFTERMATH
Exchange-Rate Policies in 1970 and 1971.
ping
lihich During January and most of February 1970, the government continued
as its policy of sharing the responsibility for rationing the limited supply of for-76ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS, 1966—71
eignexchange with the commercial banks. The ceilings for these banks on for-
eign-currency letters of credit, which had been reduced in November 1969
to 55 per cent of their base-period level, were renewed at these low levels in
early January, as were the special time-deposit requirements for letters of
credit. Moreover, reserve requirements for commercial banks, savings banks,
development banks, and rural banks were all raised two percentage points in
late January. This changed the reserve requirement for commercial banks I
from16 per cent to 18 per cent by March.
The balance-of-payments situation continued to worsen, however. Presi-
dent Marcos underscored the seriousness of the problem when he told a busi-
ness group in early January: "We have unfortunately financed the foreign-
exchange requirements of our development with credits of short maturities.
I am told by my advisers that because of the increase in short-term debts, the
total payment for interest and amortization of foreign obligations of the coun-
try this fiscal year ending June 30 will take over one-half of our export
earning." 10Morespecifically, outstanding public and private foreign debts N
amounted to more than $1.6 billion by the end of 1969, of which over $450 A
million was due in 1970 and two-thirds within four years. Of the debt matur-
ing in one year, $196 million was owed by the Central Bank, $58 million by N
the government, and $198 million by the private sector.1'
The only realistic method of coping with the exchange crisis was again —
torequest financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and to
ask foreign banks to agree to longer repayment terms. An IMF consultative fl
group arrived in the Philippines on January 10, 1970. Foreign creditors took ci
the position that they would accept a restructuring of their debt provided the 0
government agreed to the IMF's stabilization recommendations for correcting ti
the country's weak financial condition and thereby obtained its third credit a
tranche from the fund.'2 The advice of the fund on exchange-rate policy was
either to devalue significantly or float the peso. t
The government chose to float the peso rather than devalue sharply, and
freed the peso on February 21, 1970. This action together with the other r
major policies followed in 1970 and 1971 are summarized in Table 4-5. The
peso-dollar rate promptly rose, from P3.90 to over P5.5, and reached P6.4 1
by the end of the year. At the same time that the exchange rate was permitted t
to move to its free-market level, the Central Bank lifted the monthly ceilings
on foreign-currency letters of credit, the special time-deposit requirement, V
and the ban on open-account financing arrangements. Certain exchange con- f
trols remained, however. The sale of foreign exchange for imports of non- C
essential consumer goods still required prior approval of the Central Bank.
This prior-approval requirement in effect continued the ban on imports of
some 400 luxury commodities.13 Importation by means of documents against ti
acceptances and open-account arrangements were permitted only for periods
.171
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TABLE 4-5
69 Major Trade, Payments, and Related Economic Policies, 1970—71
in
of Feb. 1970Peso floated in foreign-exchange markets, and peso-to-dollar rate rose to
P6.4 by end of year. Some exchange controls removed but exporters of
in major products required to convert 80 per cent of their receipts at old
ks rate of P3.90 per dollar.
Special export tax of 8 or 10 per cent substituted for dual exchange-rate
Si- arrangement for exporters.
Beginning of gradual two-percentage-point rise in reserve requirement for
commercial banks.
.5.
July 1970Issuance of circular requiring most imports to be covered by letters of
credit. Commercial banks voluntarily accept 30 per cent (later raised
to 50 per cent) margin deposit against letters of credit.
Nov. 1970Passage of law limiting power of the government to borrow abroad.
50 Aug. 1971Central Bank imposes 15 per cent reserve requirement against margin
deposit required for letters of credit.




ie not shorter than 180 days. Ceilings and limitations on the sale of foreign cx-
change for current invisible payments such as travel abroad and remittances
of profits also continued in operation. Furthermore, the explicit approval of
the Central Bank was necessary for new foreign borrowings and investments,
it and the remittance of the assets of emigrants was restricted.
An important feature of the new exchange system for exporters was
that 80 per cent of all receipts from the leading export products, namely, logs,
centrifugal sugar, copra, and copper ores and concentrates were to be sur-
rendered to the Central Bank at the old rate of P3.90 to the dollar. The re-
maining 20 per cent could be sold at the free-market rate. However, in May
'4 1970, as a result of the strong opposition of exporters, a special stabilization
tax on exports was substituted for this differential exchange-rate arrangement.
For logs, copra, sugar, and copper ores and concentrates, the tax on the total
value of exports was set at 10 per cent. An 8 per cent tax rate was established
for the following exports: molasses, coconut oil, desiccated coconut meal or
cake, unmanufactured abaca, unmanufactured tobacco, veneer core and sheets,
c. plywood, lumber, canned pineapple, and bunker fuel oil. In addition, any
product whose annual export value exceedect $5millionwas made subject to
the 8 per cent tax during the fiscal year following attainment of this export
'tis value. However, exceptions to the stabilization tax were also made. In July
4
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1970,exports of pineapple juice and concentrates were exempted from the
tax;andshortly thereafter refined sugar, wood moldings, diesel fuel oil, and
industrial fuel oil were added to the exemption list.
Another aspect of the government's stabilization efforts was the estab-
lishment by the Central Bank in July of an Exchange Stabilization Fund.
Commercial banks were required to sell 10 per cent of their foreign exchange
receipts directly to the Central Bank in order to provide foreign exchange for
the stabilization fund. The proceeds were used to fund deposits being main-
tained with the consortium of creditor commercial banks in the United States.
The peso cost of a dollar remained essentially unchanged at about P6.4
throughout 1971. Controls over the ability of importers to purchase certain
imports continued in effect, but there was an easing of controls for export-
oriented firms and firms registered with the Board of Investment (BOl). In
February, for example, export-oriented firms were permitted to import ma-
chinery and equipment by means of documents against acceptance and open-
account arrangements without prior Central Bank approval, provided pay-
ment was made within 360 days. This privilege was extended, in August, to
BOl-registered firms as well as to importers purchasing agricultural ma-
chinery and equipment.'4
Some restrictive measures were put into effect, however, in the last half
of the year to limit imports and neutralize excess liquidity. In late July, for
example, the Central Bank issued a circular requiring all imports to be cov-
ered by letters of credit except imports by firms with a history of open-account
or document-against-acceptance arrangements.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies.
In addition to permitting the peso to depreciate, the government followed
a policy of monetary and fiscal restraint as part of its stabilization program.
Starting on May 1, 1970, reserve requirements were raised another 2 per cent
in four successive equal monthly installments of one-half per cent, with the
result that by August the requirement for commercial banks was 20 per cent.
Rediscounting privileges were also curtailed.'5 Other anti-inflationary steps
taken at this time were to rescind all previously granted exemptions on the
2 per cent interest equalization charge imposed by the Central Bank and to
increase the maximum rate of interest that banks could pay on time deposits.
An important voluntary measure agreed upon later in the year by the com-
mercial banks was the adoption of a uniform minimum margin deposit
against letters of credit. The level was initially set, in July, at 30 per cent, but
was raised to 50 per cent in October 1970.
During 1971, the Central Bank continued trying to exercise monetary
restraint. For example, it raised the preferred rediscount rate to all rural banks
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for certain paper from 2 per cent to 3 per cent and also established ceilings
for credit accommodations by banks to their directors, officers, or principal
stockholders. Firms that were delinquent in paying off debts to government
financial institutions also were required to obtain the explicit consent of the
1. Central Bank to obtain foreign exchange. The most important policy adopted
by the Central Bank, however, was the imposition in August 1971 of a 15
per cent reserve requirement on commercial banks against the 50 per cent
a- margin deposit required for letters of credit. In late November, after some
s. postponements, the required reserve was raised to 30 per cent.
4 For most of 1970 the monetary authorities succeeded in halting any fur-
n ther increases in the money supply and were even able to decrease it for a
time. However, by November the money supply had passed its January level
n and in December was 6.2 per cent above the December 1969 figure. The rise
continued into 1971, with the result that the money supply as of December
1971 was 10.3 per cent greater than its December 1970 level.
The national government managed to achieve a surplus of P143
o in its operational cash transactions in 1970, but it incurred a deficit of P91
million in 1971. Both the internal and external public debt also increased
over these two periods. The internal debt rose 8 per cent in 1970, mainly due
If to a net increase in Treasury bills and the issuance of new bonds for infra-
structure investments by the various development corporations of the govern-
ment. During 1971 the internal debt expanded another 10 per cent as an in-
t tensification of spending on infrastructure and social services took place.
Much of the increase in the external debt of the government and the
monetary institutions from $828 million in December 1969 to $1,041 mil-
lion in December 1970 (a 25 per cent increase) was related to the need for
adequate working balances of foreign exchange after the exchange crises of
I late 1969. At the time that the peso was floated, the Central Bank obtained
its third credit tranche of $27.5 million from the IMF, a $40 million credit
t from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a $40 million loan from the
First National City Bank of New York, and $18.5 million under the country's
special drawing rights at the IMF. Later in 1970 the Central Bank secured
S credits of $35 million from Japanese banks and $10 million from Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust of New York. Furthermore, in June the Central Bank
successfully completed negotiations for the restructuring of $247 million of
debt with U.S banks and $27 million with European banks. The U.S. debt,
- mostof which had been due in 1970, was consolidated into a loan payable
t over a six-year period. After repayments during the year, the level of the Cen-
t tral Bank's external debt on December 31, 1970, was $102 million higher
than a year earlier, and the country's total external debt was $140 million
higher. However, during 1971 the total external debt increased only $34 mu-
lion, or 3 per cent.'680ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS, 1966—71
Inan effort to prevent future episodes of excessive foreign borrowing
by the government, limits on borrowing from abroad were imposed under a
law (R.A. 6142) passed in November 1970. Under this law the government
is permitted to borrow only $1 billion from abroad at a rate of not more than
$250 million a year. The credits also must have a minimum of 10 years' ma-
turity, and the interest paid must not exceed the rate charged by international
financial institutions. It is further stipulated that government guarantees of
foreign borrowing by other institutions may not exceed $500 million.
Besides the upper bound set to government borrowing under the act, it
is stated that the payment of amortization and interest on the country's total
external debt must not exceed 20 per cent of average foreign-exchange re-
ceipts over the preceding three years. To implement this provision, the Cen-
tral Bank issued Circulars 315 and 316, in December 1970, establishing
guidelines on foreign borrowings, i.e., any credit over 360 days. First, the
Central Bank reiterated the requirement that foreign loans to the private sec-
tor must have its prior approval. Next, the bank established the following min-
imum repayment terms for loans of differing magnitudes: (a) loans of $250,-
000 or less should have a maturity of at least five years; (b) loans of between
$250,000 and $500,000 should be repayable in no less than eight years; and
(c) loans over $500,000 should have a maturity period of at least twelve
years. However, applications for loans exceeding $500,000 with at least an
eight-year maturity period inclusive of a three-year grace period on repay-
ments of principal should be approved for export industries. Loans to over-
crowded industries or to firms in arrears with government financial institutions
were not to be approved by the Central Bank. Finally, it was stipulated in Cir-
cular 315 that the interest rates on foreign borrowings should not be more than
2 per cent above the prime rate of the lending country.
Both the law passed by Congress and the circulars issued by the Central
Bank can only be justified as emergency measures. Tying the length of the
repayment period to the size of a loan is, for example, a highly arbitrary and
inefficient long-run method of preventing excessive foreign borrowing.
Economic Effects of the Currency Depreciation.
As is indicated in Table 4-6, the dollar price of the peso increased sig-
nificantly immediately after it was permitted to seek its free-market level on
February 21, 1970. The rate thereafter continued to rise gradually, and in
December 1970 it was fixed by agreement among the commercial banks. There
was a slight decline in August and September 1971, but by December 1971,
the rate had returned to its December 1970 level.
The fear of further intensification of the social unrest that was triggered
by price rises associated with the currency depreciation apparently accountsTHE 1970 EXCHANGE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 81
TABLE 4-6
Foreign-ExchangeRates, 1970—71
(pesos per U.S. dollar)
1970January 3.902 September 6.338
February 1—20 3.906 October 6.402
February 21—28 5.556 November 6.402
March 6.057 December 6.402
April 6.132 1971January—July 6.402
May 6.082 August 6.391
June 6.173 September 6.379
July 6.203 October—November 6.400
August 6.238 December
SOURCE: Central Bank of the Philippines, Central Bank News Digest, 1970 and 1971.
for the decision to fix the dollar value of the peso. Since excess demand condi-
tions developed soon after the peso was stabilized, bankers again began ra-
tioning foreign exchange among established customers. They also began bid-
ding among themselves for exporters' dollars, using such devices as offering
exporters lower lending rates than prevailed in the general market. Of course,
in effect this depreciated the peso still further.
Exports quickly increased after the currency depreciation. Their value
had remained at around $850 million from 1966 through 1969 but rose 24
per cent to $1,062 million in 1970. In volume terms, exports, which had actu-
ally fallen about 5percent between 1966 and 1969, rose 14 per cent between
1969 and 1970. These favorable performances in value and volume terms con-
tinued in 1971. The value of exports rose 5percent, to $1,122 million, while
the volume of exports increased 13 per cent. The balance of trade also im-
proved dramatically. Because of the government's policies of monetary and
fiscal constraint as well as its continued controls over some foreign-exchange
payments, the value of imports declined by over $40 million between 1969
and 1970. The deficit on the trade account fell from $276 million in 1969 to
$28 million in 1970. In 1971, the result was not quite as satisfactory, as im-
ports rose to $1,186 million, but the trade deficit was still only $64 million.
Among individual items, coconut products exhibited an especially im-
pressive export performance over the two-year period, 1970—71. The export
quantities of these products from 1969 to 1971 rose as follows: copra, 34 per
cent; desiccated coconut, 35 per cent; coconut oil, 96 per cent; and copra
meal or cake, 63 per cent. The volume of exports of copper concentrates con-
tinued their upward trend, increasing 40 per cent over the two-year period.
Bananas also became one of the ten leading exports, expanding in volume
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nearly900 per cent. Sugar exports also performed well, rising 37 per cent
in the period. Exports of logs and lumber, pineapples, and plywood did not
change significantly. Another favorable development on the export side was
the 26 per cent increase in the value of manufactured goods other than the
processing of such products as sugar and coconuts. However, these exports
still amounted to less than 0.7 per cent of all commodity exports. b
n
NOTES r
1. Central Bank of the Philippines, Annual Report, 1966, p. 1.
2. The new categories introduced into the Central Bank's commodity classification c
systemat this time were defined as follows: unclassified producer (consumer) goods
were goods produced in sufficient quantity to meet local demand and of acceptable b
quality and offered at competitive prices; semiunclassified producer (consumer) goods c
were goods that were produced locally but which did not fully satisfy the criteria for B
unclassified goods as to quantity, quality, or price. All goods not otherwise classified in
the other categories were included in these two categories. p
3. Sixto K. Roxas, "Exchange Rate Experience and Policy in the Philippines Since
World War II," in H. Grubel and T. Morgan, eds., Exchange Rate Policy in Southeast r
Asia (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1973), p. 58. t
4. Specifically, the following export activities were excluded from these credit ceil-
ings: c
a. The production of logs and lumber; sugar, copra, copra meal or cake; copper
concentrates; coconut oil and desiccated coconut; abaca; plywood and veneer; canned
C,
pineapple; and other agricultural, forestry, marine, and base metal products; r
b. The processing or manufacture of finished products for exportation, with an
export potential as evidenced by export records or contracts and with an indigenous
raw materials content of at least 70 per cent;
c. The processing or manufacture of finished products in which domestic value
added is less than 50 per cent, but of which at least 50 per cent of total output is des-
tined for export.
5. Later in the year, imports of machinery and spare parts for use by local wearing
apparel and embroidery firms were added to the list of industries exempted from this
requirement and also from the requirement that all imports be financed by letters of
credit.
6. Imports of capital goods valued at over $20,000 were permitted after July 1969
only on a deferred payment basis (20 per cent down and payment terms of at least three
years), and in November, prior approval of the Central Bank was required for imports
of any single unit of machinery or equipment valued at over $50,000.
7. Only $500 per year could be o.btained per adult resident of the Philippines for
travel to North and South America, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and
the Middle East, and a $200 limit was set for travel to Hong Kong, Taipei, Okinawa,
Guam, and other neighboring countries. In addition, formal regulations covering securi-
ties transactions involving foreign exchange were
8. An analysis by the BOl staff of selected income statements of proposed firms
with respect to the extent of the aid provided by the act gives the following percentages
for the ratio of the increase in profits due to tax assistance to the firm's total costs:
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it mechanical grain driers, 3; globe and gate valves, 3; hand pump manufacturing, 0.6;
malleable iron fittings, 5; roller bearing units, 3; files, 7; and small gasoline engines, 7.
it 9. If one assumes all the revenue of the firms in the BOl sample was export rev-
enue, the combined effect of the Investment Incentives and Export Incentives Acts gives
e the following percentage ratios for the increase in profits to the firm's total costs: me-
chanicat grain driers, 8; globe and gate valves, 9; hand pump manufacturing, 2; mallea-
ble iron pipe fittings, 8; roller bearing units, 6; files, 7 (unchanged since these contain
no raw materials); and small gasoline engines, 8.
10. Speech by President Marcos to Rotary Club of Manila, January 8, 1970, as
reported in Central Bank News Digest, February 10, 1970, p. 6.
11. G. V. Soliven, "Management of External Debt," reported in Central Bank News
Digest, July 13, 1971, p. 3.
12. 0. S. Licaros, Speech before Rotary Club, February 26, 1970, as reported in
n Central Bank News Digest, March 10, 1970, p. 2.
s 13. The requirements that imports of capital goods with a unit value of over $20,000
e be made only on a deferred payment basis and that importations of single units of ma-
s chinery or equipment valued at over $50,000 could be made only with prior Central
r Bank approval also were continued.
a 14. In September, the requirement that monthly imports exceeding $50,000 receive
prior Central Bank approval was also lifted for these firms. At the same time, imports
e of nonagricultural machinery and equipment in excess of $50,000 monthly were also per-
1 mitted for firms not qualifying as export-oriented or registered with the BOl, provided
the capital goods did not add to capacity in industries listed as overcrowded.
15. Concurrent with the freeing of the peso, the rediscount ceiling for domestic
commercial banks was reduced from 125 per cent of paid-up capital plus 90 per cent of
r other net worth items as of June 20, 1967, to 100 per cent of paid-up capital as of De-
cember 31, 1969. That this change represented a reduction in rediscount ceilings was
reported by Governor G. Licaros, "Impact of the Stabilization Program on the Develop-
ment of the Philippine Economy" (Speech reported in Central Bank News Digest, No-
vember 3, 1970), p. 3.
16. In. this period the Central Bank's external debt decreased $48 million, the na-
tional government's rose $34 million, and the volume of external credits extended to
government corporations rose $48 million.
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